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Abstract. The theory in Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action is built from his-
torically uncontroversial assumptions about interpersonal communication. Today, evolving
technologies are changing communication dynamics in ways that invalidate some of these
once uncontroversial assumptions. How do these changes affect Olson’s thesis? Using research
tools that were not available to Olson, we differentiate collective actions that new communic-
ation technologies help from the endeavors that they hurt. In the process, we refine some of
Olson’s best-known ideas. For example, we find that evolving communication technologies
eliminate many of the organizational advantages that Olson attributed to small groups.
1. Introduction
Mancur Olson provided 20th century social science with some of its most
important new insights. His best-known contribution is The Logic of Collect-
ive Action, a book that converts sound microeconomic fundamentals into a
paradigm-changing view of when individuals can act collectively. In the book,
henceforth referred to as Logic, Olson identifies a critical null hypothesis:
if the members of some group have a common interest or objective, and
if they would all be better off if that objective were achieved, [then] the
individuals in that group would, if they were rational and self-interested,
act to achieve that objective (Logic, 1).
He then rejects the hypothesis, concluding that
unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless
there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in
their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to
achieve their common or group interests (Logic, 2; emphasis in original).
Mancur is no longer with us, but the legacy of his Logic remains. It contin-
ues to help people around the world better understand the dynamics of public
goods provision. But new forces are emerging, with some able to change
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these dynamics. In what follows, we focus on one of these forces – evolving
communication technologies. We argue that while evolving technologies help
some collective endeavors, they endanger others. In the process, we extend
Logic’s legacy by clarifying its applicability in a changing world.
Our argument begins with the premise that technology changes long-
standing expectations about what people can learn about each other. For
almost all of human history, physical impediments such as mountains,
walls and long distances limited real-time monitoring of others. Cognitive
constraints imposed other limits. For example, fundamental properties of
short-term memory (e.g., the fact that it can store no more than a dozen items
at a time) implied that a person who wanted to track the simultaneous actions
of a group would succeed only if the group were small.
Evolving communication technologies, such as television and computers,
undermine these expectations. Television does so by allowing people to
observe far away others at a minimal cost; and this medium’s evolution con-
tinually expands what people can learn. For most of the 20th century, viewers
were limited to choosing from among two to five general-purpose channels.
Now, cable and satellite technologies allow viewers to choose from numerous
specialized information and entertainment outlets. Television changes who
can track whom.
Computers change expectations in other ways. The Internet, for example,
allows individuals to post, at a minimal cost, messages and images that can
be viewed instantly by global audiences. It is worth remembering that as
recently as the early 1990s, such actions were impossible for all but a few
world leaders, public figures and entertainment companies – and even for
them only at select moments. Now millions take such abilities for granted.
When people combine Internet technologies with digital imaging software
(e.g., videoconferencing), they can emulate face-to-face communication with
numerous and distant others. Other software allows them to record and ana-
lyze such interactions. It is, therefore, increasingly easy for people to track the
activities of large groups.1 It is also worth noting that telephones, televisions
and computers were once exclusively stationary devices. Now, the profu-
sion of wireless technology removes stationarity as a necessary condition for
distance communication.
Such advances are often hailed as harbingers of great advantages to
come. At first glance, collective action seems likely to benefit. After all, new
opportunities for low-cost communication seem like boons to many collect-
ive endeavors. But such optimistic appraisals overlook the possibility that
evolving technologies can make some collective endeavors harder to maintain
or easier to destroy. Consider, for example, collective endeavors that provide
specialized information as a selective incentive for participants. If evolving
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technologies allow individuals to acquire the information in other ways, it
can reduce individuals’ incentives to join. Many professional associations
(e.g., the American Association for the Advancement of Science) face this
threat as the content of their journals (e.g., Science, for which home or office
delivery of the paper version was once a main draw for members) is increas-
ingly available online. Alternatively, consider public goods such as national
security and individual property rights. For such goods to be maintained, cit-
izens must lend their support to extant arrangements rather than anti-system
alternatives. If evolving technologies make insurgent activities more feasible,
then incumbent public goods providers and the services they provide can be
threatened. Technological progress need not imply collective benefit.
What kinds of collective goods do evolving technologies advantage and
which collective goods do they endanger? Our attempt to answer this question
has two steps. First, we deconstruct Olson’s Logic. Then, we reconstruct it to
make it stronger.
Our deconstruction begins by focusing on one of Logic’s key conditions –
that optimal provision of a collective good requires that a group be small or
able to coerce its members or able to provide sufficient selective incentives to
contributors. Continuing the deconstruction, we show that a group’s commu-
nicative capacity affects its ability to satisfy each part of the key condition and
that evolving technologies can change these capacities. The logical conclu-
sion of these changes undermines several widely held beliefs about collective
action.
Consider, for example, the idea that “small groups are more efficient
and viable than large ones” (Logic, 3). We find that evolving technologies
weaken this claim, even making size irrelevant in some collective action
contexts. Technologies have this effect by reducing groups’ organizational
costs (which otherwise grow with group size) or by making more difficult
attempts to benefit from a group’s effort without contributing to it. In other
words, evolving technologies can make electronically transmitted symbols
substitutes for “small group advantages” in collective action contexts.
While our deconstruction draws largely on Olson’s insights, our recon-
struction builds in insights from studies that did not exist when he wrote his
classic treatise. The studies are: strategic communication models and bar-
gaining models of coalition termination. The communication models show
that decreasing communication costs – an effect that all of the technologies
named above can have – need not make collective action more efficient. In the
bargaining model we highlight, individuals can do nothing or contribute to
one of three collective endeavors – an approach that differs from the conven-
tion of treating individual contributions to a collective endeavor as a product
of a binary choice (i.e., “contribute to collective good X” or “do nothing.”)
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Figure 1. Our deconstruction of Olson’s Logic
The model shows how evolving technologies affect the relative attractiveness
of competing collective endeavors – causing some to fall apart.
In sum, evolving technologies affect opportunities and incentives that are
relevant to collective action. As a result, they advantage some collective en-
deavors and endanger others. In this essay, we use Olson’s Logic as the core
of an approach that clarifies when and where each consequence occurs.
2. Deconstructing Logic
Our deconstruction of Logic begins by focusing on a necessary condition
for optimal collective goods provision – a group must be small or able
to coerce its members or able to provide sufficient selective incentives to
contributors. We then deconstruct this condition, showing that the alleged
advantages of small group size, coercion, and selective incentives each de-
pend on underlying assumptions about communicative capacities. We follow
these demonstrations with facts about how evolving technologies affect these
capacities. The result is new insights on when evolving technologies help (and
hurt) collective endeavors. Figure 1 depicts our deconstruction’s structure.
Logic answers questions about the conditions under which non-excludable
collective goods are provided optimally. Olson’s approach builds from the
premise that these questions “cannot be answered satisfactorily without a
study of the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action open to in-
dividuals in groups of different sizes” (Logic 21). This approach reveals a
deep conflict between personal desires and group goals.
though all of the members of the group . . . have a common interest in
obtaining this collective benefit, they have no common interest in paying
the cost of providing that collective good (Logic, 21).
Logic’s main contribution is to clarify how this conflict is resolved. Its
central result is:
If the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal
welfare, they will not act to advance their common or group objectives
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unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or unless some separate
incentive, distinct from the achievement of the common or group interest,
is offered to the members of the group individually on the condition that
they help bear the costs or burdens involved in the achievement of the
group objectives. (Logic, 2)
While subsequent writers attacked various components of this conclusion,
Olson defended it throughout his career, including in his final book:
Groups can overcome the great difficulties of collective action and ration-
ally serve their collective interests in only two circumstances. One is when
the numbers in a group are fewþThe other circumstance that can enable
a group to overcome the difficulties of collective action is the availability
of selective incentives (Olson 2000: 87–88).
In such defenses, Olson identifies the necessary condition for collective
action on which we shall focus – a group must be small or able to coerce its
members or able to provide sufficient selective incentives to contributors. We
now deconstruct the three parts of this condition in turn.
2.1. Group size
Olson claims that in collective action contexts, “small groups are more ef-
ficient and viable than large ones” (Logic, 3). We will show that evolving
technologies dilute the power and reduce the applicability of this claim. We
build our case by showing how evolving technologies affect organizational
costs and noticeability – two factors that Olson cites (below) as causes for
larger groups’ comparative disadvantage.
The standard for determining whether a group will have the capacity
to act, without coercion or outside inducements, in its group interest
. . . depends on whether the individual actions of any one or more members
in a group are noticeable to any other individuals in the group (Logic, 45).
[T]he larger the group is, the more agreement and organization it will
need (Logic, 46).
Since communicative capacity affects both factors, and since evolving tech-
nologies can affect communicative capacity, we contend that the technologies
weaken the correspondence between group size and collective success.
2.1.1. Organizational costs
Olson identifies “three separate but cumulative factors that keep larger groups
from furthering their interests” (Logic, 48). The first two factors are reducible
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to simple math – as the number of people in a group grows, there is a decrease
in the relative share of benefits that any fixed-size subset of the group abstains
from providing a collective good. The decrease also reduces incentives to
contribute.2 Since communication technologies do not alter this math, we
turn to the remaining factor.
Third, the larger the number of members in the group the greater the
organization costs . . . For these reasons, the larger the group the farther
it will fall short of providing an optimal supply of a collective good, and
very large groups normally will not, in the absence of coercion or separ-
ate, outside incentives, provide themselves with even minimal amounts of
a collective good. (Logic, 48; underline added).
Elsewhere, Olson explains why communication costs increase with group
size.
[T]o establish a group agreement or organization will nonetheless always
tend to be more difficult the larger the size of the group, for the larger the
group the more difficult it will be to locate and organize even a subset
of the group, and those in the subset will have an incentive to continue
bargaining with the others in the group until the burden is widely shared,
thereby adding to the expense of bargaining. In short, costs of organiza-
tion are an increasing function of the number of individuals in the group.
(Logic, 46; underlines added).
That the costs of locating and organizing and the costs of continued bar-
gaining grow as does group size we treat as uncontroversial. For example,
locating and organizing N > 1 items of any kind often takes more time
that locating and organizing just one. This was especially true in the past. If
group members were dispersed over a large space, then the marginal cost of
locating and organizing additional members could be substantial. Moreover,
more members means more possibilities for bargaining – at a minimum, an
agreement must be struck with every additional member.
Evolving technologies, however, can affect both sources of organizational
costs, particularly those associated with locating members. Political cam-
paigns, for example, use electronic communications to motivate supporters
and organize simultaneous public rallies in multiple and spatially dispersed
places. Such levels of effectiveness were once impossible. When evolving
technologies reduce organizational costs, the groups most affected are those
for whom such costs were once prohibitive. If such costs are more likely to
be prohibitive as group size increases then, all else constant, these techno-
logies weaken the oft-cited bond between collective effectiveness and small
numbers.
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Turning to the impact of evolving technologies on the cost of continued
bargaining, it is harder to draw a single inference. On the one hand, evolving
technologies can decrease the expense of sending and receiving offers and
counter-offers. So, evolving technologies can help groups that are otherwise
crippled by communication limits that impede necessary bargaining. On the
other hand, lower communication costs can prolong bargaining, and hence in-
crease bargaining costs, by making it less expensive for participants to deliver
demands.
2.1.2. Noticeability
Many people presume that free riding – attempts to reap the benefits of a non-
exclusive collective good without contributing to it – becomes easier as group
size grows. We find that evolving technologies weaken this correspondence.
We bring this weakened correspondence to light by comparing privileged,
intermediate, and latent groups – the three categories Olson used to organ-
ize and condense many theoretical insights. Consider his definitions of the
categories:
A ‘privileged’ group is a group such that each of its members, or at least
one of them, has an incentive to see that the collective good is provided,
even if he has to bear the whole burden of providing it himself. (Logic,
49–50).
An ‘intermediate’ group is a group in which no single member gets a
share of the benefit sufficient to give him an incentive to provide the good
himself, but which does not have so many members that no one member
will notice whether any other member is or is not helping to provide the
collective good. (Logic, 50; underline added).
[The latent group] is distinguished by the fact that if one member does
or does not help provide the collective good, no other one member will
be significantly affected and therefore none has any reason to act. Thus
an individual in a “latent” group, by definition, cannot make a noticeable
contribution to any group effort, and since no one in the group will react if
he makes no contribution, he has no incentive to contribute. Accordingly,
large or ‘latent’ groups have no incentive to act to obtain a collective
good . . . Only a separate and selective incentive will stimulate a rational
individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way (Logic, 50–51;
underline added).
While group size is irrelevant to the definition of a privileged group, it is
inherent in the other definitions. Indeed, Olson equates large and latent groups
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in the quote. Group size, however, is not really sufficient to distinguish latent
groups from others. Instead, the definition’s key distinction is noticeability –
members’ ability to notice each other’s actions (or inactions). In the defini-
tions of intermediate and privileged groups, individual actions are noticed; in
latent groups, they are not. Noticeability matters because without it individual
actions are not seen, which facilitates free riding.
Evolving technologies affect noticeability. The Internet, for example, re-
duces to near zero the marginal costs of sending messages to large numbers of
people. It is also one of many technologies that reduce distance-related mar-
ginal costs (e.g., it costs many people no more to send an e-mail to Tokyo or
Timbuktu than it does to send an e-mail to a person 10 feet away). Moreover,
merging these technologies with database software allows people to record
growing ranges of activities at shrinking costs, thus countering the potential
for information overload. Each of these advances weakens the dependence of
noticeability on small numbers.
We contend, moreover, that evolving technologies can be more important
than size in determining a group’s effectiveness. Compare, for example, the
abilities of a small group with bad communicative capacity to that of a large
group whose technology and individual communicative incentives yield ef-
fective tracking of large populations. The small group fails Olson’s criteria of
noticeability. In the large group, members’ actions are noticeable. For them,
evolving technologies allow electronically transmitted symbols to substitute
for advantages in facilitating collective goods provision that Olson attributed
to small numbers.
When evolving technologies convert venues where individual actions are
effectively anonymous into settings where people can hold each other ac-
countable for their actions, they can change whether or not groups are latent.
But such technologies are not sufficient to prevent free riding. Preventing free
riding requires that increased observational powers be coupled with the ability
to reward or punish individual actions that are critical to collective success.
Therefore, if evolving technologies are to break the dependence of collective
effectiveness on group size, coordination with a system of selective incentives
–discussed below – is necessary.
2.2. Coercion
In addition to small numbers, Olson cites coercion as a means for accomplish-
ing collective ends. He focuses primarily on the role of coercion in the growth
of labor unions (Chapter 3) and cites various means of compulsory member-
ship as critical to union success. Earlier, however, Olson taps the same themes
in his discussion of social pressures. Since this discussion is closer to a purely
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theoretical statement, we use it to clarify how evolving technologies affect
coercion’s viability as means for inducing collective action.
Olson states that “Economic incentives are not, to be sure, the only in-
centives; people are sometimes also motivated by a desire to win prestige,
respect, friendship, and other social and psychological objectives” (Logic,
60). In his subsequent definition of social pressures and the conditions under
which they can be applied, who-knows-what-about-whom is a critical factor.
Olson contends that
In general, social pressure and social incentives operate only in groups of
smaller size, in groups so small that the members can have face-to-face
contact with one another (Logic, 62).
Olson’s subsequent defense of this statement clarifies the kind of assump-
tions about communication technology that it was reasonable for him to
make. It also clarifies how we should revise this contention. His defense is
as follows:
. . . in any large group everyone cannot possibly know everyone else, and
the group will ipso facto not be a friendship group; so a person will or-
dinarily not be affected socially if he fails to make sacrifices on behalf of
his group’s goals (Logic, 62).
He then clarifies his intent in an eloquent footnote:
If the members of a latent group are somehow continuously bombarded
with propaganda about the worthiness of the attempt to satisfy the
common interest in question, they may perhaps in time develop social
pressures not entirely unlike those that can be generated in a face-to-
face group, and these social pressures may help the latent group to obtain
the collective good. A group cannot finance such propaganda unless it is
already organized and it may not be able to organize until it has already
been subjected to the propaganda; so this form of social pressure is prob-
ably not ordinarily sufficient by itself to enable a group to achieve its
collective goals. It would, for example, seem unlikely that there would be
much prospect of success in a program to persuade farmers through pro-
paganda to further their interest by voluntarily restricting output, unless
there were some captive source of funds to finance the effort. So this form
of social pressure generated by mass media does not seem likely to be an
independent source of coordinated effort to bring about the satisfaction of
a common interest (Logic 63: fn. 8; emphasis added).
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In 1965, the situation described in the footnote was undoubtedly correct.
Decades later, however, evolving technologies reduce substantially the costs
of communicating with large audiences.
At a minimum, a single farmer with an inexpensive PC, widely available
software, and a low-cost Internet service provider can make a web page view-
able by millions. If the farmer spends more, he can buy an electronic mailing
list that allows him to send messages to thousands or potential contributors.
Will these entreaties be persuasive? Later in the paper, we use insights from
strategic communication models to address this question. For now, we merely
recognize that when Olson wrote Logic, it was impossible for a single farmer
(or any equivalently positioned individual) to communicate with numbers
sufficient to provide the collective good in question. Now it is possible for
this farmer to apply social pressure in a way that his grandfather would have
thought unimaginable. Something fundamental has changed.
Devices that increase individual capacities for real-time monitoring allow
for the imposition of “social pressures” that were once limited to groups
whose members lived in close proximity. For examples, one need look no
further than the virtual communities that emerge in e-mail based list serv-
ers, web-based chat rooms, and auction sites such as EBay. These collective
endeavors generate valuable non-excludable benefits (in that the content
they produce is public) by using software that records individual actions.
Technologies allow participants to police destructive behaviors and enforce
deliberative norms that promote collectively valuable interactions (see, e.g.,
Resnick and Zeckhauser N.d.). Such uses of technology weaken the claim
that effective coercion requires small numbers.
2.3. Selective incentives
A selective incentive is an excludable good that is provided to contributors
only. Communication technologies affect when selective incentives are ef-
fective. They do this because the application of such incentives requires a
contract – explicit or implicit – of the following form: in exchange for my sac-
rifice of X today, some subset of the collective will provide me with selective
incentives Y now or in a future period. Such contracts have terms that must
be communicated and enforced to be effective. Therefore, the expected return
from making or accepting such offers depends on people’s communicative
capacities; in particular, their credibility.
If members of a latent group offer a selective incentive contract to pro-
spective contributors who are uncertain about the group’s willingness or
ability to follow the contract, then the offer is more likely to be declined.
Communication technologies, however, can change which offers are cred-
ible. Suppose, for example, that an implicit contract promises a selective
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incentive to be delivered within 10 days. If the potential contributor cannot
track the actions of those who offered the contract, the promise may be seen
as less likely to be kept. However, given a communication technology that
allows less expensive or more effective tracking, the same transaction may
becomes less risky and, hence, more likely to be accepted. Later, we turn
to post-Logic branches of economic theory, such as strategic communication
models, to further clarify the correspondence between evolving technologies
and credibility.
How evolving technologies affect selective incentives is not limited to
changing credibility. Some selective incentives take the form of “contributors-
only” information. In cases where potential members find such information
valuable, the incentive to join can be powerful. Evolving technologies affect
such incentives in multiple ways.
On the positive side of the ledger, evolving technologies make many
kinds of information less expensive to collect and distribute. Where previous
generations needed to go to libraries or other physical locations to collect
information, current generations can do so from anywhere that a suitable
wireless device can operate. Where previous generations needed costly phys-
ical stock such as printing presses and paper to record and disseminate private
information, current generations can record and store information on tiny
microchips. And where previous generations had to pay relatively large costs
to send bulky materials over long distances, recent generations send large
documents through the air with the press of a button. All of these changes are
a boon for those who want to offer information as an incentive to others.
On the other hand, the same technological advances may give prospective
contributors opportunities to obtain information on their own, which reduce
the value of the incentive. As professional associations are learning, for ex-
ample, once journal content is available online – particularly to institutional
subscribers – demand for memberships decrease. For such groups, evolving
technologies make some collective endeavors more difficult to maintain.
3. Reconstructing Logic
Our deconstruction of Logic raises important questions about the conditions
under which a group can act collectively. These questions concern the rela-
tionship between group size and collective effectiveness, the conditions under
which selective incentives are a viable means for recruiting contributors, and
the sustainability of currently successful collective endeavors. While Olson’s
Logic provides important clues about the impact of evolving technologies, we
now refine these answers further.
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We begin by using strategic communication models to clarify how
evolving technologies affect credibility in ways that affect the viability of
selective incentives. We then use a bargaining model to further clarify the
kinds of collective endeavors that evolving technologies endanger.
3.1. Strategic communication models
We can use strategic communication models to better understand how
evolving technologies affect credibility.3 These game theoretic models have
two basic types – signaling models and cheap talk models. For initial in-
sights, we turn to seminal models. We then use more recent models to distill
additional lessons.
The seminal signaling model (Spence 1973) focuses on the plight of an
employer who seeks new workers. While the employer prefers to hire skilled
applicants, she cannot observe applicants’ skill levels in advance. However,
she knows that skilled applicants can purchase a tangible good – formal edu-
cation – at a lower cost than can unskilled applicants. Moreover, she can
observe whether a particular applicant bought an education (i.e., obtained a
degree). The model’s conclusion is that the degree persuades the employer of
an applicant’s skill level if unobservable skill levels and observable education
levels are sufficiently correlated.
The seminal cheap talk model (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) has sim-
ilar dynamics. It features a speaker and a receiver. The receiver’s job is to
make a choice. Before the receiver chooses, a speaker advises her about the
consequences of her choice. Unlike the receiver, the speaker knows these con-
sequences. The model’s conclusion is that effective communication requires
a speaker and receiver to have common interests.
Both results share a common intuition: if choices that are good for the
receiver also benefit the speaker, then the speaker has an incentive to reveal
what he knows and the receiver should believe what she hears (see also Farrell
and Gibbons, 1989). By contrast, if what is good for a speaker is bad for a
receiver, and vice versa, then the opportunity cost of speaking (as compared
to saying nothing) or of following a speaker’s advice (as opposed to ignoring
it) is high.
These findings imply that if group members employ a technology that
decreases the cost of communication to large or geographically dispersed
groups, the extent of interest commonality among group members affects
the technology’s impact. When interests are sufficiently convergent, evolving
technologies can transform groups once crippled by large numbers into
groups capable of collective success. As interests diverge, technology’s
impact diminishes.
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Subsequent models further clarify how evolving technologies affect col-
lective action. Consider, for example, models developed by Lupia and
McCubbins (1998). They examine the effect of exogenous forces such as pen-
alties for lying (a cost for making false statements), and threats of verification
(with probability 0 ≤ v ≤ 1, the receiver learns the truth value of the sender’s
statement before she acts on it). The implication of their work for Logic is as
follows: when interest commonality or external forces (which they show to
be substitutes for one another under specific conditions) provide sufficient in-
centives for truthful revelation, new technologies are best positioned to reduce
organizational costs and increase noticeability. For groups whose desire to act
collectively is overwhelmed by geographical distance or large numbers, such
technologies can yield greater effectiveness. Moreover, if these technologies
make verification easier to accomplish or penalties for lying easier to apply,
then they can reduce uncertainty pertaining to selective incentive contracts –
which can yield even more collective success.
Their findings also suggest collective endeavors that evolving technologies
endanger. Consider, for example, situations where credibility requires costly
signaling (e.g., cases where individuals otherwise lack sufficient evidence of
common interests and where sufficient penalties for lying and verification
threats cannot be implemented). In such cases, technologies that reduce sig-
naling costs can reduce members’ abilities to assess others’ credibility. For
example, before e-mail it was relatively costly for constituents to contact their
congressional representatives. Therefore, when representatives were flooded
with mail and phone calls from constituents, it was treated as a credible signal
of public concern. Now, several technologies permit a constant deluge of
citizen contact. While this change has salubrious aspects in other domains,
large numbers of constituent messages are now less credible signals of pub-
lic demand. To the extent that collectively beneficial activities still depend
on such credibility inferences being made, evolving technologies make the
activities less likely.
3.2. Bargaining model insights
The preceding sections clarify how technological advances affect collective
actions. While such advances make new kinds of collective action possible,
we now focus more on the endeavors they endanger. We do so by adapting
a model of coalition termination, originally developed to explain the fall of
governing coalitions in parliamentary democracies (Lupia and Strom, 1995).
As applied here, the model clarifies when evolving technologies provide
group members with the ability and incentive to exchange their contribution
to current collective arrangements for other opportunities.
328
The model begins with the premise that individuals have a limited capacity
to contribute to group efforts. In it, actors can contribute to no more than one
of three collective endeavors and no collective endeavor succeeds without a
minimal degree of participation – our model involves three individuals and we
assume that a collective good is produced if at least two individuals contribute
to it.
Initially, two of the three actors provide a collective good. We call the
group containing these actors the incumbent collective goods provider. A
third actor is not a contributor. A technological change then occurs, which
can affect the utility consequences of available actions.
The actions available to each actor are: “contribute to no collective good”,
or “contribute to one of the three potential collective goods.” The potential
collective goods are those that are produced by each possible combination of
two actors (e.g., actors 1 and 2 provide “good 1–2,” actors 1 and 3 produce
“good 1–3” and so on.) Each actor derives a distinct value from each collect-
ive good (e.g., actor 1 may derive more utility from “good 1–2” than from
“good 1–3”) and, as is true in Logic, “each individual in a group may place
a different value upon the collective good wanted by his group” (Logic, 22;
e.g., actor 2 may derive more utility from “good 1–2” than does actor 1).
Which, if any, collective good is provided follows a bargaining process
in which actors make offers in exchange for contributions. Each offer spe-
cifies what share of available selective incentives will go to each actor.
If actors make no offers and do not contribute to a collective good, then
they pay no costs and receive a utility based on the value of any collective
goods provided.4 Otherwise, their utility is reduced by the amount of their
contribution and the cost of making an offer.
Lupia and Strom (1995: 656) find that the incumbent collective good
provider survives only if every possible pair of actors (i.e., every alternative
collective good provider) contains one member who prefers the incumbent ar-
rangement to either having no collective good provided or the best alternative
arrangement available to it. Comparative statics reveal the kinds of incumbent
collective goods providers that are most and least likely to survive. To see
how, note first that if there exists an alternate collective good that provides
individuals with greater utility than no collective good, then offers will be
made to individuals who (1) suffer most if no collective good is provided, and
who (2) derive little utility from the collective good that will result of other
coalitions occurs. Such actors will have low bargaining power and require
few selective incentives in return for a contribution
Evolving technologies have an impact by affecting the numbered factors.
If, for example, evolving technologies increase the value of the outcomes in-
dividuals can produce without acting collectively, then these individuals have
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greater bargaining power, which in turn reduces the set of selective incent-
ive contracts they will accept, and can topple the incumbent collective good
providing coalition. Put another way, technological changes that increase the
utility of coalescing with other actors endangers incumbent collective goods
providers not merely by giving contributors another place to go, but also by
making them less likely to renew the existing terms of their selective incentive
agreement.
Alternatively, by increasing noticeability, decreasing organizational costs,
or increasing the range over which credible commitments are possible,
evolving technologies can transform formerly unattractive partners into at-
tractive ones. And what are the welfare consequences of such changes? The
answer is not as obvious as it may first appear. Indeed, it is trivial to prove
that evolving technologies need not increase produce social welfare. For an
example, one need look no further than terrorist attacks on the United States
and the ways in which cell phones, videotapes and the Internet helped to draw
people from the collectives to which they once contributed to endeavors, such
as Al Qaeda, that took thousands of innocent lives.
4. Conclusion
Evolving communication technologies affect several factors that used to dis-
tinguish effective collectives from ineffective ones. Technologies that reduce
the cost of sending information long distances (or to many people) can
reduce organizational costs, increase noticeability, and make ineffective com-
municative networks effective. If group members’ interests are sufficiently
common, or if they interact in contexts that induce them to share information,
these technologies can also make selective incentives a more viable recruit-
ment strategy. Evolving technologies, as a result, change which groups can
and cannot act collectively; doing so in a way that undermines many widely
held beliefs about the logic of collective action. In particular, evolving tech-
nologies can erase the disadvantages of being large – which should change
the rule of thumb that many people use to distinguish latent groups from other
kinds.
While it is natural to assume that any technology that reduces costs relev-
ant to collective action makes it easier, we have also identified circumstances
where evolving technologies create new problems. Such circumstances are
characterized by technologies that make communication more difficult (by
allowing key individuals to better mask their activities), increase the relat-
ive benefits of free riding, or increase the utility people can achieve without
collective goods.
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In sum, our work shows the importance of being more specific about the
role of communication in theories of collective action. Without such spe-
cificity, it is difficult to understand whether and how technological advances
that change communicative incentives and opportunities alter who joins with
whom. We encourage other scholars to pursue this line of argument with
even greater precision. In addition to extending the spirit of Mancur Olson’s
approach to the problem of collective action, such research will also extend
Logic’s substantive legacy.
Notes
1. Gates (1999) describes how the evolution of such technologies has changed organizational
capacity. Consider, for example, McDonald’s restaurants who, through the use of evolving
technologies, now can tailor marketing and internal allocation strategies around real-time
tallies of sales at all of its restaurants.
2. “First, the larger the group, the smaller the fraction of the total group benefit any person
acting in the group receives, and the less adequate the reward for any group-oriented
action, and the farther the group falls short of getting an optimal supply of the collective
good, even if it should get some. Second, since the larger the group, the smaller the share
of the benefit going to any one individual, or to any (absolutely) small subset of members
of the group, the less the likelihood that any small subset of the group, much less any
single individual, will gain enough from getting the collective good to bear the burden of
providing even a small amount of it . . . ” (Logic, 48).
3. This description follows Druckman and Lupia (N.d.).
4. The correspondence between this essay’s description and phenomena in the original
model are as follows:
This article Lupia and Strom (1995)
Collective goods The policies produced by parliamentary
majorities.
Individuals Parties
Technological change A change in the consequences of repla-
cing the current government.
Contributing to a collective good Membership in government
The share of available selective incentives Power within the coalition
No collective good is provided Dissolution
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